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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No, 890382-CA

vs.
Priority No, 2

FRANK LEROY ARCHULETA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of second degree
murder in the Second Judicial District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish

defendant's guilt of second degree murder?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a):
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in
granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary

evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses
•

• • •

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989):
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
(d) while in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of . . .
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5109(2)a, when the victim is younger than 14
years of age, causes the death of another
person .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (Supp. 1989):
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child
serious physical injury or, having the care
and custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict serious physical injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly,
the offense is a felony of the second degree
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with second degree murder.
Defendant was convicted before Judge Roth on December 4. 1988.
Judge Roth sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a
term of not less than five years but which may be for life.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Preston Sherman died of battered child syndrome on July
31, 1988 (T. 62, 538-39).

The medical examiner concluded that

the immediate cause of Preston's death was multiple blunt force
injuries (T. 60). Among these injuries were included several
bruises to the face and head which were freshly inflicted (T. 3839).

Preston suffered from edema (swelling) of the brain which
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could have been caused by a recent blow to the head, or a lack of
oxygen or a lack of blood flow to the brain caused by shock (T.
39-40, 67). The deep musculature in the back of his chest wall
and the back of his right lung were freshly bruised consistent
with either a severe beating or an automobile accident (T. 42).
Preston's abdomen was distended and his ascending colon
and the mesentery (supporting tissues) were bruised (T. 45-46).
Also bruised were the solus muscles which run along the spinal
column (T. 48). These are all deep, protected structures that
require a forceful blow to inflict the injuries observed (T. 4649).
Preston's fingers and toes had suffered recent
contusions and abrasions consistent with squeezing or crushing
and inconsistent with slamming them in drawers or kicking hard
objects (T. 49-51, 57-59, 545). On his right buttocks and right
calf were fresh, small, oval-shaped burns that were well
circumscribed and caused by something that was quite hot such as
heated metal (T. 52-55).
burn mark (T. 57-58).

On his left, fourth toe was an older

On the underneath at the base of his penis

was an old burn scar similar to that caused by a cigarette or
other pointed source of heat (T. 59-60).
The severe injuries Preston suffered would be painful
and would most likely produce shock (T. 70, 543). Initially, he
would probably cry and as shock developed, he would become
lethargic and, later, comatose (T. 70, 543). At 3:30 in the
afternoon a few short hours before his death, however, Preston
was laughing and playing in a bubblebath (T. 388, 390). When his

mother left him at about 7:30 p.m., Preston did not appear
injured (T. 397-98).
Defendant had previously been observed hitting Preston
hard in the middle of his back (T. 490-91, 495). He was also
observed twice bathing Preston in a tub of cold water and ice
cubes because Preston wet his pants (T. 491-92, 494-95).
Defendant had earlier been charged in Juvenile Court
with abusing Preston (T. 635). Furthermore, defendant admitted
he abused Preston (T. 662). Defendant spanked Preston every
other day or so for wetting his pants, put him on the toilet for
several hours at a time, and placed him in a cold bath (T. 638,
664-65, 667). Defendant also admitted spanking Preston shortly
before he died for wetting his pants (T. 645). Nancy Delgado,
Preston's mother, never severely punished Preston.

She would

merely slap Preston's hands or swat his bottom (T. 284, 355).
Once defendant began living with Preston, the child began
receiving bruises (T. 304).
Prior to his death, Preston sustained injuries that
alarmed medical caretakers and raised the suspicion of abuse.

On

January 22, 1988, Preston was treated for the burn on his penis
(T. 98). It was a localized, circumscribed burn inconsistent
with the alleged cause by a soup spill into his lap (T. 100-01).
On March 21, 1988, Family Services were called to investigate
Preston's multiple bruises on his face, ears and buttocks along
with a laceration on his penis (T. 108). The treating physician
opined that Preston had been abused (T. 111).
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Defendant was alone with Preston at the time Preston
died (T. 200). Nancy Delgado, Preston's mother, had gone to
Burger King to buy dinner (T. 645). Defendant claims he heard
Preston grunt, went into the bathroom, and found Preston on the
floor having difficulty breathing (T. 646-47).

However, the

medical evidence showed Preston's injuries were inconsistent with
defendant's story but were sustained by a much greater force than
a fall off a toilet onto a carpeted floor (T. 42, 46, 49, 63, 67,
71, 76, 542, 546). Furthermore, many of Preston's injuries were
less than two hours old, and some could have been made within a
few minutes before death (T. 61, 62).
Defendant offered inconsistent explanations of
Preston's death.

At the scene, he said Preston must have

swallowed a bone or a razor (T. 147). At trial, he denied this
statement (T. 669). He also stated at the scene that he was in
another room when he heard Preston cry out or scream in the
bathroom, and found Preston clutching his belly saying it hurt
(T. 164-65, 182). On route to the hospital, he repeated the
story (T. 169). Defendant later stated that he did not know
whether he found Preston on the toilet or on the floor (T. 191).
Defendant also gave a statement that said Preston grunted before
defendant came into the bathroom, was lying on the floor with his
right arm shaking but did not speak (T. 507-08).

When defendant

was informed that Preston was dead, he asked "does this mean I am
going to be locked away forever?" (T. 194).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Preston Sherman died of battered child syndrome at the
age of two years.

Defendant had a history of abusing Preston and

admitted using excessive force on Preston.
with Preston on the night Preston died.
which were less than two hours old.

Defendant was alone

Preston had bruises

The finding of the court

that defendant was abusing Preston is supported by the clear
weight of the evidence.

Thus, there was no mistake in convicting

defendant of second degree murder.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
DEFENDANT'S GUILT
The Utah Supreme Court applies Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) when reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of
the evidence.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987);

see also Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(7) (Supp. 1989).

This rule

provides that "[fjindings of fact . . . shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

The court will set aside the

findings only "if the findings are against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made . . .H
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.
In State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988), the
court upheld a bench trial of second degree murder against a
sufficiency of the evidence appeal.
-K-

The court stated that the

standard applied to bench trials required that the clear weight
of the evidence presented at trial not be contrary to the
verdict.

Id. at 787. However, the court accords deference to

the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate the
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses.

j[d*

"[W]e will

review the record to see if the clear weight of the evidence, not
including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict."
Id.

The court held that the evidence placed defendant at the

scene of the crime and the physical evidence was consistent with
the trial court's judgment.

Although the defendant presented an

alibi, the court deferred to the trial court's determination of
defendant's credibility.

JUi. at 788.

Thus, the court was not of

a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made."

Id.

In the present case, defendant contends there is
insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the
evidence "strongly suggest[s] that Nancy Delgado had disciplined
Preston Sherman."

Defendant also argues that Nancy Delgado "also

caused serious bruising to the child . . . and that she was also
alone with the child in the bathroom"

(Br. of App. 5). However,

defendant's evaluation of the standard of review is misapplied.
Merely because defendant claims Nancy Delgado also disciplined
Preston, does not mean that a mistake has been made.
Furthermore, the clear weight of the evidence is not contrary to
the verdict.

The testimony and physical evidence presented at

trial supports the trial court's verdict that defendant caused
Preston Sherman's death.

The statutory requirements of second degree murder are:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
(d) while in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of • . .
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5109(2)a, when the victim is younger than 14
years of age, causes the death of another
person . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989).

Subsection 76-5-

109(2)(a) defines child abuse as:
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child
serious physical injury or, having the care
and custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict serious physical injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly,
the offense is a felony of the second degree
. . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1989).

Preston Sherman was a

victim of battered child syndrome (T. 623, 71). Preston had
multiple blunt force injuries to his chest, abdomen, and head.
He also had multiple internal injuries and burns on his right
buttock and calf (T. 52, 60). The multiple injuries, some which
were less than two hours old, caused Preston's death (T. 61, 62).
Preston had a circular old burn scar on the base of his penis,
which looked similar to a cigarette burn (T. 59-60).

He also had

burns and contusions on his toes and fingers (T. 49-51, 57-59).
These injuries, in multiple stages of healing, led to the
diagnosis of battered child syndrome (T. 64-65, 538-39).
The evidence presented showed defendant, not Nancy,
physically abused Preston.

Preston had been treated for a burn

on his penis on January 22, 1988.

-8-

The first and second degree

burns were on the scrotum and shaft of his penis (T. 97-98).

The

defendant, who was alone with Preston at the time he was burned,
stated that Preston had spilled soup on himself, causing the burn
(T. 630). However, doctors testified the burn mark was
inconsistent with defendant's testimony (T. 59, 100). It was a
localized, circumscribed burn and there were no burns on his
buttocks, on the back of his thighs, nor were there splash marks
or drip marks which is normal in a splash burn (T. 100). Thus,
the burn was not caused by a hot soup spill, which would lead to
an inference that defendant had caused the burn.
Furthermore, Preston also started receiving bruises and
scrapes on his body after defendant started living with him.
These injuries were reported to the Social Services Department
which sent an agent to investigate (T. 86). The agent visited
Nancy Delgado's home and took Preston to the hospital for an
examination (T. 89). Preston was diagnosed as suffering from
suspected child abuse syndrome (T. 108). Defendant admitted in
Juvenile Court that he had abused Preston (T. 636, 662). The
court ordered defendant to leave the house and restrained him
from disciplining Preston (T. 635, 664). However, defendant
resided with Nancy and Preston a while later (T. 382, 385).
Defendant also admits to using excessive punishment on
Preston.

Defendant admits sucking on Preston's ears and bruising

them (T. 634). He would place Preston on the toilet seat and
leave him there for one to two hours (T. 665, 667). He would
spank Preston hard without Preston's pants on (T. 638, 665).
Defendant also would put Preston in cold bath water as a form of
punishment and dunk Preston's head under the water (T. 288, 638).

It can be inferred from the evidence and defendant's
past history that defendant was intentionally or knowingly
abusing Preston on the night he died.

Defendant was alone with

Preston while Nancy went to Burger King to buy their dinner (T.
645).

Right before Nancy left, defendant spanked Preston and

then Nancy put him on the toilet (T. 399-400).

Defendant claims

that 2-3 minutes after Nancy left, he heard Preston grunt, went
to the bathroom, and found Preston on the floor having difficulty
breathing (T. 646-47).

He picked Preston up, tried blowing in

his mouth and ran to his neighbor's house (T. 647). The
neighbors called the paramedics who arrived 3-4 minutes later (T.
650).

Preston was pronounced dead at the hospital.
The medical testimony indicates Preston's injuries

could not have been caused by Preston falling off the toilet onto
a carpeted floor (T. 42). The injuries Preston suffered would be
commonly found in a person who had been in a car accident or
severely beaten (T. 42). Thus, defendant's testimony is
inconsistent with the medical evidence.
Furthermore, defendant also gave conflicting statements
to the paramedics, the police and the by-standers about whether
Preston was standing or lying on the floor when defendant entered
the bathroom and whether Preston had spoken to defendant (T. 148,
164-65, 182, 507). Preston also had blood on his lips and there
were drops of Preston's blood on the carpet and the toilet (T.
157, 213-14).
Although Nancy was alone in the bathroom with Preston
prior to leaving, Nancy did not hit Preston and he did not fall
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against the toilet (T. 466). Preston climbed onto the toilet
himself and Nancy did not notice anything wrong with him (T.
436).
The clear weight of this evidence is not contrary to
the verdict.

The evidence places defendant at the scene of the

crime and the physical evidence supports the trial court's
judgment that the defendant abused Preston.

Although defendant

presented evidence to show Nancy also disciplined Preston, the
trial court chose to believe only defendant used excessive
punishment on Preston.

This court should defer to the trial

court's determination of defendant's credibility,

Goodman, 763

P.2d at 787. Thus, the findings that defendant is guilty of
second degree murder are not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the jury could believe,
beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant committed the second degree
murder.

Thus, the State requests this Court to affirm

defendant's conviction.
DATED this

/ljf\

day of August, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
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